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This article calls on the EU to fill the governance gap developing as the United States 
retreats from holding companies responsible for extraterritorial human rights abuses. 
Doing so would facilitate the location of a new European identity in human rights 
leadership. The leadership would provide a compelling justification for European 
integration, one that the public could more easily understand and support. In the current 
economic climate, this is more necessary than ever. 
 
  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
¶1  The European Union should enable jurisdiction over foreign direct liability claims 
against companies. In April, the United States retreated from holding companies 
responsible for extraterritorial human rights abuses.1 No alternative means for imposing 
accountability currently exists.2 If the EU were to act to fill the governance gap that has 
resulted, it would facilitate the redress of grave wrongs and contribute to a revitalized 
European identity based on human rights leadership.3 
¶2  For several decades, the U.S. offered victims of international corporate human 
rights abuses access to justice in its courts. A 1789 law that permits foreigners to file suit 
under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) evolved to enable American jurisdiction over the 
claims.4 No other country offered noncitizens such straightforward access to its courts for 
the judicial review of actions that took place abroad.5  
                                                        
* Technical Advisor, Bank for International Settlements, Visitor, Columbia Law School. 
1 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 1 (2013). For a discussion of the general trend in the U.S. 
as perceived by the author, see also Jodie A. Kirshner, Why Is the U.S. Abdicating the Policing of 
Multinational Companies to Europe: Extraterritoriality, Sovereignty, and the Alien Tort Statute, 
30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 259 (2012). 
2 See Kiobel, 569 U.S. at parts II and V. 
3 For arguments that a European identity could flow from human rights leadership, see Armin Von 
Bogdandy, The European Union as a Human Rights Organization? Human Rights and the Core of the 
European Union, 37 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1307, 1308 (2000).  
4 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). Enacted in 1789 with little surviving legislative history, the ATS states: “The 
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in 
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” Id. 
5 For cases demonstrating the use of the statute, see Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); 
Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 395 F.3d 932 (9th 
Cir. 2002), vacated, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003); see also OLIVIER DE SCHUTTER, EXTRATERRITORIAL 
JURISDICTION AS A TOOL FOR IMPROVING THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACCOUNTABILITY OF TRANSNATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS 6 (Dec. 2006), available at http://198.170.85.29/Olivier-de-Schutter-report-for-SRSG-re-
extraterritorial-jurisdiction-Dec-2006.pdf (report prepared as a background paper for a seminar organized 
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¶3  Pursuant to the ATS, the U.S. adjudicated claims of corporate complicity in foreign 
torture, execution, genocide, and slavery. Successful outcomes included settlements on 
behalf of Nigerian children killed from drug tests secretly conducted by the 
pharmaceutical company Pfizer;6 survivors of the Holocaust for losses to Banque Paribas 
which appropriated their assets during the German occupation of France;7 and Chinese 
dissidents who were detained and tortured after Yahoo! revealed that they were 
disseminating pro-democracy materials.8 
¶4  In interviews, survivors have stressed the importance of having their suffering 
recognized in a judicial forum. They believe that the judicial process in America 
contributed to the strengthening of human rights norms around the world.9 
¶5  The U.S., however, has now drawn back from its leadership in human rights. This 
April, the U.S. Supreme Court barred most “case[s] seeking relief for violations of the 
law of nations occurring outside the United States.”10 Claims under the ATS always faced 
obstacles, and they occupied an increasingly uncomfortable position within the American 
legal system.11 In 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court narrowed the statute in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain to include only claims based on principles of customary international law so 
fundamental that they could be incorporated into American federal common law.12 In 
2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum, finding that the statute applied only to natural persons and did not reach 
corporate defendants.13 The Supreme Court reviewed the decision of the Second Circuit 
                                                                                                                                                                     
in collaboration with the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights in Brussels on 
November 3–4, 2006).  
6 Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009). 
7 Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117, 128 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). 
8 Xiaoning v. Yahoo! (N.D. Cal. 2007) (settled out of court and settlement unpublished); Xiaoning et al. v. 
Yahoo! Inc. et al., JUSTIA DOCKETS & FILINGS, 
http://dockets.justia.com/docket/california/candce/4:2007cv02151/191339. 
9 See, e.g., REDRESS, TORTURE SURVIVORS’ PERCEPTIONS OF REPARATION: PRELIMINARY SURVEY (2001), 
available at http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/TSPR.pdf; see also Brian Seth Parker, 
Applying the Doctrine of Superior Responsibility to Corporate Officers: A Theory of Individual Liability 
for International Human Rights Violations, 35 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 3 (2012) (“Beyond 
monetary redress, ATS litigation provides plaintiffs with symbolic vindication and empowerment while 
serving as a deterrent against future corporate complicity in international law violations.”). 
10 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 1, 14 (2013). 
11 The statute provided only a narrow basis for jurisdiction and required plaintiffs to allege a specific wrong 
that violates an established norm of international law. The claims remained subject to dismissal for reasons 
that include the case being better suited to the legal system of a different country. Only four cases 
proceeded to trial, but some achieved substantial settlements. See Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce 
N.A., Inc., 578 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2009); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002); In re 
Union Carbide Corp. (Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in December, 1984), 634 F. Supp. 842 
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff’d, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987). The doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity 
developed in the common law prior to the enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 
1602. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989); Carpenter v. 
Republic of Chile, 610 F.3d 776 (2d Cir. 2010); Belhas v. Ya’Alon, 515 F.3d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 2008).  
12 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004) (citing In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 
1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994)) (noting that “[a]ctionable violations of international law must be of a norm that 
is specific, universal, and obligatory”). 
13 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010). Since the Kiobel decision, other circuit courts considered whether the ATS 
allows for extraterritorial jurisdiction over corporate defendants. Conflicting authorities resulted. Compare 
Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011), with Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 
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pertaining to jurisdiction over corporations, solicited additional briefing on 
extraterritoriality, and foreclosed most extraterritorial applications of the statute.14 
¶6  The Supreme Court decision appears to have left the widow of the Nigerian activist 
Dr. Barinem Kiobel no remedy for his execution by the Nigerian military with the alleged 
complicity of Royal Dutch Petroleum.15 Kiobel and other residents of the Ogoni region 
resisted unregulated oil exploration that Royal Dutch Petroleum was undertaking through 
contracts with the Nigerian military dictatorship.16 As a result, they were arrested, 
tortured, convicted of murder in a sham trial, and shot.17 With no redress available in 
Nigeria, Kiobel’s widow turned to the American courts, but they must now withdraw 
from imposing extraterritorial corporate human rights accountability. 
¶7  The retrenchment has provided the EU with an opportunity to step forward. 
Allowing foreign direct liability claims against companies to find a home in the courts of 
the EU Member States would enable the EU to project a moral example around the 
world.18 It would also help it to demonstrate a commitment to human rights leadership.19 
The leadership would provide a compelling justification for European integration, one 
that citizens of the EU could easily understand and support.20 In the current economic 
climate, this is more necessary than ever.21 
 
 
II.  THE GOVERNANCE GAP FOR MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 
¶8  Extraterritorial jurisdiction has become essential for imposing accountability on 
multinational companies. The Alien Tort Statute in the U.S. provided such jurisdiction.22 
                                                                                                                                                                     
F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011), and Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Aziz v. 
Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 394 n.6 (4th Cir. 2011) (declining to reach question of corporate liability and 
dismissing on alternative grounds). To address the developing split, the Supreme Court accepted review of 
Kiobel.  
14 See, e.g., Meir Feder, Commentary: Why the Court Unanimously Jettisoned Thirty Years of Lower Court 
Precedent (and What that Can Tell Us About How to Read Kiobel), SCOTUSBLOG (April 19, 2013), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=162650; see also Dorothy Shapiro, Kiobel and Corporate Immunity Under 
the Alien Tort Statute: The Struggle for Clarity Post-Sosa, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 209 (2011), available at 
http://www.harvardilj.org/2011/03/online_52_shapiro/. A plurality affirmed the Second Circuit’s holding 
that corporations are not under the ATS’s jurisdiction. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 1, 
14 (2013). 
15 Id. 
16 Shapiro, supra note 14, at 213. 
17 Id. 
18 See, e.g., Andrew T. Williams, Taking Values Seriously: Towards a Philosophy of EU Law, 29 O.J.L.S. 
549, 576–77 (2009) (“[M]erely preserving the EU is no longer sufficient. Its survival must also reflect a 
‘moral politics’ that respects articulated values in a concrete fashion.”); Von Bogdandy, supra note 3, at 
1308. 
19 See, e.g., Samantha Besson, The European Union and Human Rights: Towards a Post-National Human 
Rights Institution?, 6 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 323, 326 (2006) (arguing “for a conception of the EU qua a post-
national institution of global justice”). 
20 See infra Section II. 
21 See infra Section II. 
22 See supra Introduction. 
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The recent withdrawal of the jurisdiction by the U.S. Supreme Court has produced a 
governance gap.23  
¶9  Corporate structures have grown increasingly complex, necessitating extraterritorial 
jurisdiction. Corporate groups clustering multiple separate companies into global 
networks of subsidiaries have supplanted earlier companies that sold shares only to 
individual investors.24 “Cross-shareholding,” “inter-enterprise contracts,” linked 
directorships, and “concentrated voting rights” have become common.25 
¶10  These attributes have allowed companies to evade the territorial legal systems 
designed to govern them.26 The international structures have enabled more efficient 
delivery of goods and the standardization of products, but the scope and financial strength 
of multinational companies have eclipsed individual nations and their laws.27 
Transnational corporate strategies have conflicted with circumscribed national legal 
regimes.28 
¶11  Multinational companies have eluded territorial jurisdiction in several ways.29 First, 
they have distributed actions that collectively amount to illegality across separate entities 
                                                        
23 See infra Section I. 
24 See, e.g., DE SCHUTTER, supra note 5, at 40 (“the multinational [corporation] appears as a coordinator of 
the activities of its subsidiaries, which function as a network of organisations working along functional 
lines . . . .”). The first holding company act, which allowed corporations to buy and hold stock in other 
corporations, was not adopted until 1888. See Act of Apr. 4, 1888, ch. 269, § 1, 1888 N.J. Laws 385; Act of 
Apr. 7, 1888, ch. 295, § 1, 1888 N.J. Laws 445; see also Meredith Dearborn, Enterprise Liability: 
Reviewing and Revitalizing Liability for Corporate Groups, 97 CAL. L. REV. 195, 203 (2009) (“In 1888, 
New Jersey was the first state to grant permission for any corporation chartered in the state to own stock in 
any other corporation.”). 
25 See, e.g., J.E. Antunes, The Liability of Polycorporate Enterprises, 13 CONN. J. INT'L L. 197, 205–06, 
205 n.29 (1999) (citing Investment Trust Corp. v. Singapore Traction Co., 1 Ch. 615 (1935) (Eng.) (noting 
“where only one share was capable of outvoting the remaining 399,999.”)); John Albion Young Andrews, 
The Interlocking Corporate Director (May 1982) (unpublished M.A. dissertation, University of Chicago) 
(on file with author); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of the Corporation: A Legal Analysis, 89 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1461 (1976). 
26 See, e.g., Beth Stephens, Amorality of Profit, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 45, 58 (2002) (“Regulatory 
schemes are largely domestic, based upon national laws, administrative bodies and judicial systems, while 
transnationals operate across borders.”); Wayne Ellwood, Multinationals and the Subversion of 
Sovereignty, 246 NEW INTERNATIONALIST 4, 7 (1993) (“Companies are less attached today than ever to 
their country of origin.”). 
27 See, e.g., Viven Schmidt, The New World Order, Incorporated: The Rise of Business and the Decline of 
the Nation State, 124 DEADALUS 75 (1995) (stating that the nation-state is becoming less powerful than 
business); Detlef F. Vagts, The Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge for Transnational Law, 
83 HARV. L. REV. 739 (1970); Stephens, supra note 26, at 58. 
28 See, e.g., Stephens, supra note 26, at 54 (“Multinational corporations have long outgrown the legal 
structures that govern them, reaching a level of transnationality and economic power that exceeds domestic 
law’s ability to impose basic human rights norms.”); see also ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL 
LITIGATION AND THE QUEST FOR REASONABLENESS 81 (1996) (“[T]he law has not kept up with 
reality. . . . [L]aw was developed with a view to a single firm operating out of a single state, owned by 
shareholders who . . . were not other corporations.”); Ellwood, supra note 26, at 7. 
29 On the principle of territorial jurisdiction, see U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2, art. 2, para. 4; see also 
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909); Stephens, supra note 26, at 82. On 
evasion of responsibility in a territorially-based system, see, e.g., Michael K. Addo, Introduction to HUMAN 
RIGHTS STANDARDS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 3, 11 (Michael K. Addo 
ed., 1999). 
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in different countries, so that each has operated within the law.30 Second, they have 
carried out harmful conduct in countries other than where its effects are felt.31 
Alternatively, companies have partitioned their assets, shifting money within the 
corporate group, so that no funds are recoverable in the territorial jurisdiction.32 
Companies have also acted in complicity with the ruling government of the host country, 
and they have threatened to withhold future patronage in order to pressure the regime not 
to pursue accountability.33  
¶12  Corporate law, moreover, has deemed each incorporated unit of a corporate group 
separate and distinct from its shareholders. The legal separation has contributed to the 
susceptibility of multinational companies to abuse by actors who treat human rights 
norms lightly.34 The notion of separation developed to limit the liability of individual 
shareholders in order to encourage them to invest, allowing companies to pool capital and 
put it to efficient use.35 Individual units of corporate groups, however, now generally own 
                                                        
30 Comments In Response To The UN Special Representative Of The Secretary General On Transnational 
Corporations And Other Business Enterprises’ Guiding Principles – Proposed Outline, AMNESTY INT’L 19 
(Oct. 2010), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/IOR50/001/2010/en/71401e1e-7e9c-
44a4-88a7-de3618b2983b/ior500012010en.pdf; Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary 
General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 
20, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/27 (Apr. 9, 2010) (by John Ruggie) (“[C]hallenge is the attribution of 
responsibility among members of a corporate group.”). 
31 See, e.g., DE SCHUTTER, supra note 5, at 21. 
32 AMNESTY INT’L, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: THE DUTY OF STATES TO ENACT AND ENFORCE 
LEGISLATION, INTRODUCTION 17 (Aug. 31, 2001), available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/IOR53/002/2001/en/292e21c5-1dee-401d-8501-
6b54748731da/ior530022001en.html; Joseph Stiglitz, Regulating Multinational Corporations: Towards 
Principles of Cross-Border Legal Frameworks in a Globalized World Balancing Rights with 
Responsibilities, 23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 451, 474 (2007). 
33 Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 16, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/35/Add.2 (Feb. 15, 
2007) (“[T]he State lacks both the ability and inclination to exercise jurisdiction, particularly where it seeks 
to encourage companies registered on its territory to expand their overseas operations.”); F. McLeay, 
Corporate Codes of Conduct and the Human Rights Accountability of Transnational Corporations: A Small 
Piece of a Larger Puzzle, in TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 219–20 (Olivier De 
Schutter ed., 2006); Beth Stephens, Translating Filartiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis 
Of Domestic Remedies For International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 32 (2002) 
(“[T]he local municipal law might not recognize the underlying facts as a tort at all.”); Anita Ramasastry, 
Corporate Complicity: From Nuremberg to Rangoon: An Examination of Forced Labor Cases and Their 
Impact on the Liability of Multinational Corporation, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 91, 91–92 (2002).  
34 See, e.g., In re Union Carbide Corp. (Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in December 1984), 634 F. 
Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) , aff’d, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987); Jonathan A. Bush, The Prehistory of 
Corporations and Conspiracy in International Criminal Law: What Nuremberg Really Said, 109 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1094, 1105, 1198 (2009); John Ruggie, Keynote Presentation at EU Presidency Conference on the 
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework 6 (Nov. 10–11, 2009), available at http://www.reports-and-
materials.org/Ruggie-presentation-Stockholm-10-Nov-2009.pdf; Joseph E. Stiglitz, Regulating 
Multinational Corporations: Towards Principles of Cross-Border Legal Frameworks in a Globalized 
World Balancing Rights and Responsibilities, 23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 451 (2007) (Grotius Lecture, 
presented at the 101st Annual Meeting of the American Society for International Law (Mar. 28, 2007)). 
35 Reinier H. Kraakmann, The Economic Functions of Corporate Liability, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
AND DIRECTORS’ LIABILITIES 178 (Klaus J. Hopt, Gunther Teubner, & Walter de Gruyter, eds., 1985); 
WILLIAM A. GROENING, THE MODERN CORPORATE MANAGER: RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION 11 
(1981); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. 
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other units of the same group, and limited liability continues to apply to corporate owners 
within multinational companies.36 The law does not distinguish their incentives from 
those of human investors.37 
¶13  Multinational companies have exploited this legal separation to shield parent 
companies from accountability.38 These companies have strategically insulated dangerous 
activities within separate entities.39 Each entity remains legally distinct in spite of its 
overall economic interdependence, and limited liability protects the parent companies 
that own them.40 
¶14  Regulating corporate behaviour therefore demands legal liability beyond national 
borders and across corporate groups.41 Without the exercise of judicial authority outside 
of territorial jurisdictions,42 no single judicial system has the capacity to impose 
responsibility on multinational companies.43 The Member States of the EU can provide 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, and doing so would benefit European integration.44 
 
 
III.  HUMAN RIGHTS LEADERSHIP WOULD BENEFIT THE EU 
¶15  Support for extraterritorial jurisdiction in the courts of the EU Member States 
would help to ensure the future success of the European Union. In the current climate, 
with the project of economic integration in disarray, leadership in human rights provides 
a clearer purpose for a unified Europe.45 A new European identity located in the 
extraterritorial promotion of international rights could attract crucial popular support.46  
                                                                                                                                                                     
REV. 89 (1985); Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law And Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 
259 (1967). 
36 See, e.g., LOWENFELD, supra note 28. 
37 See id.  
38 See, e.g., DE SCHUTTER, supra note 5, at 36.  
39 Stiglitz, supra note 32, at 474 (“In some cases MNCs take a country’s natural resources, paying but a 
pittance while leaving behind an environmental disaster. When called upon by the government to clean up 
the mess, the MNC announces that it is bankrupt: all of the revenues have already been paid out to 
shareholders. In these circumstances, MNCs are taking advantage of limited liability.”) (citation omitted).  
40 See, e.g., LOWENFELD, supra note 28. For a private international law perspective on gaps in governance, 
see Horatia Muir Watt, Private International Law as Global Governance: Beyond the Schize, from Closet 
to Planet, available at http://works.bepress.com/horatia_muir-watt/1. 
41 See, e.g., DE SCHUTTER, supra note 5, at 21 (“[T]he interdependencies created by the activities of such 
transnational actors, and the need to devise an adequate reaction.”); Jennifer A. Zerk, Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction: Lessons for the Business and Human Rights Sphere from Six Regulatory Areas 5 (Corporate 
Soc. Responsibility Initiative, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Working Paper 
No. 59, 2010); Addo, supra note 29, at 11 (“Of all the characteristics of the law it is its predominantly 
domestic focus which impedes its effectiveness in the regulation of transnational corporations of today.”). 
42 See, e.g., DE SCHUTTER, supra note 5. 
43 Id. at 2–7; Exploring Extraterritoriality In Business And Human Rights: Summary Note Of Expert 
Meeting, CENTER FOR BUSINESS & GOVERNMENT, HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL 3 (Sept. 14, 2010), 
available at http://www.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/ruggie-extraterritoriality-14-sep-
2010.pdf. 
44 See infra Section III. 
45 See infra Section II. 
46 See, e.g., Besson, supra note 19, at 324. (“[E]conomic integration is to a large extent exhausted as a 
vision for further integration in the European Union” and “[t]he prospects of enlargement have further 
contributed in the last few years to identifying national, regional and global threats to human rights and 
Vol. 13:1] Jodie A. Kirshner 
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¶16  Human rights leadership has appeared to provide a strong rallying purpose easier 
for EU citizens to understand and support than the single market.47 Polling conducted by 
the European Commission has indicated that “the promotion of democracy and peace in 
the world” at the European level enjoyed 84% popularity, far outpacing support for 
European-level decision-making on economic issues.48 In 2011, 76% of EU citizens 
polled believed that globalization required “worldwide governance,” up from 68% since 
2010.49 “Social equality and solidarity” was frequently selected as a goal that European 
society should emphasize,
 50 and 84% felt that the EU should require developing 
countries to follow its dictates on democracy, human rights, and governance as a 
condition for receiving development aid. 
¶17  By contrast, the polling data has borne out the absence of support for economic 
integration. A growing number of EU citizens have reported the belief that the internal 
market has affected them adversely. In a recent poll conducted by the European 
Commission, 35% of participants could not explain what the internal market was, and 
responses to a subsequent poll indicated a sustained decrease in support for the Euro.51 In 
2011, 62% of EU citizens felt that the single market was only for the benefit of large 
companies, up from 55% in 2009, and 58% felt it had introduced cheap competing 
labour, up from 50% in 2009.52 Only 39% of those polled said that the single market had 
increased their standard of living.53 
¶18  The focus of the EU on economic unity initially engendered support from disparate 
political groups and elided cultural differences.54 The European project began 
conservatively, with the unification of the coal and steel industries.
 55 It gradually 
                                                                                                                                                                     
hence to conscientise the EU’s vision of itself as a global entity, whose ‘one boundary is democracy and 
human rights.’”). 
47 See, e.g., Von Bogdandy, supra note 3, at 1308; see also Williams, supra note 18, at 576–77 (“merely 
preserving the EU is no longer sufficient. Its survival must also reflect a ‘moral politics’ that respects 
articulated values in a concrete fashion.”); see also Besson, supra note 19, at 324. 
48 European Commission Directorate-General for Communication, Special Eurobarometer 379: Future of 
Europe, at 84, COM (2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_379_en.pdf. 
49 Id. at 92. 
50 Id. at 72. 
51 European Commission Directorate-General for Communication, Special Eurobarometer 363: Internal 
Market: Awareness, Perceptions and Impacts, at 12, COM (2011), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_363_en.pdf; European Commission Directorate-
General for Communication, Standard Eurobarometer 77: Public Opinion in the European Union, at 15, 
COM (2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb77/eb77_first_en.pdf. 
52 Special Eurobarometer 363, supra note 51, at 18. 
53 Id. 
54 See, e.g., BEN ROSAMOND, THEORIES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 2, 7, 10, 30 (2000); see also Sionaidh 
Douglas-Scott, The European Union and Human Rights After the Treaty Of Lisbon, 11 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
645, 647–8 (2011) (discussing absence of a concern with human rights at the start of the EU); John 
Donahue & Mark Pollack, Centralization and Its Discontents: The Rhythms of Federalism in the United 
States and the European Union, THE FEDERAL VISION 73, 95–99 (Kalypso Nicolaidis & Robert Howse 
eds., 2001) (discussing origins of the EEC); Jodie A. Kirshner, “An Ever Closer Union” in Corporate 
Identity?: A Transatlantic Perspective on Regional Dynamics and the Societas Europaea, 84 ST. JOHN’S L. 
REV. 1273, 1280–85 (2010) (discussing growth of corporate regulation). 
55 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 2; see also Gerard 
Quinn, The European Union and the Council of Europe on the Issue of Human Rights: Twins Separated at 
Birth?, 46 MCGILL L.J. 849, 858 (2001) (“The founders of the EU decided to stay away from high politics 
and to concentrate instead on the integration of limited but important cross-border economic sectors.”); 
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expanded to a broader common market, recognizing rights of the free movement of 
goods, services, and people, and trade flows expanded.56 Later, it introduced the Euro, 
which developed into a dominant world currency, used in foreign reserves and 
international debt securities.57  
¶19  Popular support for the EU, however, has not increased. Difficulty ratifying the 
Maastricht and the Lisbon treaties appeared to weaken the legitimacy of the EU.58 
Tensions over the Eurozone bailout have further highlighted divisions. The European 
Parliament and European Commission have not played significant roles in the resolution 
of the crisis and the rationales behind proposed solutions have tended more towards 
national self-interest than towards solidarity.59 A faction of British conservatives has led a 
bid to hold a referendum on EU membership.60 Slovakia refused to participate in bailout 
packages for Greece.61 Journalists have debated the prospects for dissolution of the 
Union.62 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Carlos A. Ball, The Making of a Transnational Capitalist Society: The Court of Justice, Social Policy, and 
Individual Rights Under the European Community’s Legal Order, 37 HARV. INT’L L.J. 307, 308–310 
(1996) (“The primary concern of the Community has always been economic integration; issues relating to 
social policy are viewed as secondary, to be addressed only to the extent that they impact upon economic 
integration. Economic integration, however, has not occurred in a political or social vacuum, and it is 
generally agreed that the Community has developed a social policy component that arises from, and is 
consistent with, its broader economic objectives.”) (citations omitted). 
56 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, art. 3, para. 4, May 1, 1992, 2008 O.J. (C 
115) 13; European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, Ten Years of 
Economic and Monetary Union Main Achievements, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu10/achievements_en.pdf. 
57 See generally HANS VON DER GROEBEN, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: THE FORMATIVE YEARS: THE 
STRUGGLE TO ESTABLISH THE COMMON MARKET AND THE POLITICAL UNION (1958-66) (1982); STEPHEN 
OVERTURF, MONEY AND EUROPEAN UNION (1997); Jürgen Stark, Genesis of a Pact, in THE STABILITY AND 
GROWTH PACT: THE ARCHITECTURE OF FISCAL POLICY IN EMU (Anne Brunila et al. eds., 2001); 
Christopher Taylor, Introduction: The Economics and Politics of the EMU, in EMU EXPLAINED: MARKETS 
AND MONETARY UNION (Ruth Pitchford & Adam Cox eds., 1997); Ten Years of Economic and Monetary 
Union Main Achievements, supra note 56. 
58 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1; 1992 O.J. (C 224) 1; see, e.g., Grainne de Burca, If at First You Don't Succeed: 
Vote, Vote Again: Analyzing the Second Referendum Phenomenon in EU Treaty Change, 33 FORDHAM 
INT'L L.J. 1472, 1483–84 (2010); Brendon S. Fleming, Book Review, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 561, 562–63 
(2009) (reviewing CHARLES H. KOCH JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: INTRODUCTION 
(2008)). 
59 See, e.g., Richard Bellamy & Uta Staiger, EU Citizenship and the Market, THE EUROPEAN INST. (2011), 
available at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/european-institute/analysis-publications/publications/Final.pdf. 
60 Tim Ross, David Cameron is Told to Call an EU Referendum by 2014, THE TELEGRAPH (Nov. 19, 2012, 
3:10 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/9688281/David-Cameron-is-told-to-call-an-EU-
referendum-by-2014.html; Daniel Boffey & Toby Helm, 56% of Britons Would Vote to Quit EU in 
Referendum, Poll Finds, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 17, 2012, 2:56 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2012/nov/17/eu-referendum-poll/print; Nicholas Watt, David 
Cameron Rocked by Record Rebellion as Europe Splits Tories Again: Largest Postwar Rebellion on 
Europe as 81 Tory MPs Support Call for Referendum on Britain's Membership of the EU, THE GUARDIAN 
(Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2011/oct/24/david-cameron-tory-rebellion-
europe/print. 
61 No New Aid for Greece Beyond Current Bailout: Slovakia, EU BUSINESS (Feb. 9, 2012, 2:52 PM), 
http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/finance-public-debt.f2c/; Slovakian Discord Threatens to Derail 
Eurozone Bailout Vote, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 10, 2011, 3:02 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/oct/10/slovakia-vote-eurozone-bailout-package; Nicholas 
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IV.  COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE OF EU HUMAN RIGHTS LEADERSHIP 
¶20  Not only does human rights leadership appear more likely to attract popular support 
for European integration, but the history of the EU seems to have helped the Member 
States of the EU to provide better forums for foreign direct liability claims against 
corporations than the U.S. has via the Alien Tort Statute.63  
¶21  First, the ATS has required an amorphous application of international law.64 In 
order to apply the statute, American courts have had to find that a claimant pled a cause 
of action in international law sufficiently fundamental to have developed into a 
customary norm.65 The inquiry became an obstacle to remedying human rights claims. 
¶22  The determination of whether a human rights abuse violated a customary norm, so 
that a claim under the ATS could proceed, grew increasingly restrictive. In Tel-Oren v. 
Libyan Arab Republic, a claim by Israeli citizens against a Palestinian organization for a 
terrorist attack in Haifa, a split-panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
stated that because only Congress could create a cause of action, the ATS would only 
allow redress of the handful of norms of international law in existence in 1789, when 
Congress adopted the statute.66 Using similar logic, the U.S. Supreme Court in Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain rejected the claim of a Mexican physician that he had been abducted at 
the behest of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency and detained for one day.67 According 
to the Court, the ATS could only address claims in international law containing principles 
“universally” and “obligator[il]y” defined to include the “specific” conduct alleged.68 
While detention violated a norm of international law, insufficient evidence indicated that 
the general prohibition against it included the specific conduct in dispute, captivity for 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Kulish & Stephen Castle, Slovakia Rejects Euro Bailout, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/12/world/europe/slovak-leader-vows-to-resign-if-bailout-vote-fails.html. 
62 See, e.g., Georg Lentze, EU Referendum: Pundits Mull Future Without Britain, BBC NEWS (Sept. 30, 
2012, 7:37 PM), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-19742182; Gideon Rachman, Disunion: Why 
Europe's Best Chance for Survival Is to Break Apart, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 27, 2012, 9:05 AM), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/04/disunion-why-europes-best-chance-for-survival-
is-to-break-apart/256440/; Simon Jenkins, It is Not Inevitable that the EU – or Democracy – Will Survive 
this Mess, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 24, 2011, 4:00 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/nov/24/inevitable-eu-democracy-survive-mess; Is this 
Really the End?, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 26, 2011), available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/21540255.   
63 See infra Section III. 
64 Curtis A. Bradley, The Costs of International Human Rights Litigation, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 457, 472 
(2001) (“Another reason why this litigation is difficult to contain is that the principal statutory vehicle for 
this litigation, the Alien Tort Statute, provides no guidance on the procedural or substantive issues 
surrounding this litigation. The statute (because it was not intended for this type of litigation) does not 
specify the defendants who can be sued, the nature of the claims allowed, or the limitations on such claims. 
Courts instead must look to customary international law and other common law principles. As noted above, 
however, there is significant uncertainty today surrounding both the method of customary international law 
formation and its content.”). 
65 See, e.g., Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 879–83 (2d Cir. 1980). 
66 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 801–05, 808–19 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., 
concurring). 
67 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 737–38 (2004). 
68 Id. at 732 (“Actionable violations of international law must be of a norm that is specific, universal, and 
obligatory.” (quoting In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994)))  
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS [2015 
 10 
one day.69 Cases following Sosa, although often inconsistent, continued to narrow the 
range of international laws that could sustain a cause of action in an American court. The 
Eleventh Circuit, for example, excluded all non-torture cases involving cruel, inhuman, 
or degrading treatment.70  
¶23  Second, criticisms emerged in the U.S. that plaintiff-side lawyers, working on 
contingency, used the ATS as a tool to extract large settlements from corporate 
defendants. For example, Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, a case filed on behalf of 
murdered activists in Nigeria, concluded in a settlement of $15.5 million.71 The Center 
for Constitutional Rights, a non-profit legal and educational organization, brought the 
claims in conjunction with EarthRights International, a non-profit human rights and 
environmental organization, and several private law firms.72 These groups have stated 
that the settlement funded only a portion of the costs of litigating the case.73 Nevertheless, 
the settlement contributed to the perception that attorneys had exploited the statute for 
personal gain.74  
¶24  Neither criticism would pertain to cases heard in the courts of the EU Member 
States. First, national courts in the EU have grown adept at dealing with international 
law. The establishment of the EU has exposed transnational companies to foreign laws 
and extraterritorial enforcement.75 The EU Member States must routinely accept 
                                                        
69 Id. at 737-38. 
70 Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., 416 F.3d 1242, 1245, 1247 (11th Cir. 2005). 
71 Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1402 (2001); 
Paul Magnusson, A Milestone for Human Rights, BUSINESS WEEK (Jan. 23, 2005), 
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2005-01-23/a-milestone-for-human-rights. 
72 Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release, Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. v. Wiwa, 626 F. Supp. 2d 377 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (Nos. 96-cv-8386, 01-cv-1909), available at 
http://ccrjustice.org/files/Wiwa_v_Shell_SETTLEMENT_AGREEMENT.Signed-1.pdf. 
73 Press Release, Center for Constitutional Rights, Settlement Reached in Human Rights Cases Against 
Royal Dutch/Shell (June 8, 2009), available at http://ccrjustice.org/newsroom/press-releases/settlement-
reached-human-rights-cases-against-royal-dutch/shell. 
74 Can We Sue Our Way to Prosperity?: Litigation’s Effect on America’s Global Competitiveness: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution if the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112
th
 Cong. 2 (2011) (statement 
of John H. Beisner, on behalf of the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform) (“In far too many lawsuits, 
citizens are simply pawns in an enterprising attorney/investor’s business model, the goal of which is not to 
achieve justice for the citizen, but rather to secure profits for the attorney/investor.”); Earl Silbert et al., The 
Alien Tort Statute: Next Bonanza for the Trial Bar, DLA PIPER LITIGATION RISK ALERT (Feb. 5, 2007), 
http://files.dlapiper.com/files/upload/LitigationRisk_070205.html (“Hoping for the next litigation bonanza, 
some of America's most aggressive contingency fee law firms have begun filing large-scale class actions 
under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).”); Press Release, USA Engage, New Report Describes the Rising Tide 
of Global Alien Tort Cases (Feb. 1, 2007), available at 
http://usaengage.org/News/News.asp?id=16&Newsid=840; Bradley, supra note 64, at 473 (“Now that 
Alien Tort Statute litigation has expanded to include corporate defendants, which have deeper pockets than 
individual foreign officials, the incentives to bring this litigation are only heightened, as are the dangers of 
its abuse by some plaintiffs’ attorneys.”); but see Judith Chomsky, 33 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 461, 
470 (Symposium 2010) (“These charges are simply contrary to the facts. They ignore the key role that 
public interest law centers, such as the Center for Constitutional Rights, Earthrights International, and the 
International Labor Rights Fund have played in the developing ATS corporate litigation. As a result of the 
limited success of corporate ATS cases, with the exception of litigation arising out the Second World War, 
it is unlikely that this litigation will attract practitioners looking for massive contingency fees. ATS 
litigation is more likely to remain a field dominated by the public interest and pro bono bar.”). 
75 See, e.g., Kirshner, supra note 54, at 1279–80. “The end of World War II was a time of heroic plans for 
institutionalizing inter-state relations so as to bring order into international affairs and thus blot out the 
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regulations drafted in Brussels and interpreted in Luxembourg.76 They implement 
supranational directives and invalidate conflicting national legislation.77 The Court of 
Human Rights analyzes the content of the national rules of its Member States for 
compliance with the Convention on Human Rights.78  
¶25  Second, human rights cases brought in the EU would not rely on complicated 
funding arrangements, nor would they generate large damage awards.79 Comparative 
studies have shown that damages in the U.S. vastly exceed those typical in the EU.80 
Under many of the laws of the Member States that criminalize corporate actions, victims 
may join proceedings as partie civiles and receive reparation or restitution.81 The 
possibility for these recoveries reduces the cost of litigation for private claimants, as they 
may rely on the investigations that the prosecutors have already completed.82 The 
compensation awarded to victims in the EU has also been generally low and 
predominantly symbolic.83 In the Netherlands, for example, it has amounted to roughly 
$600, on average.84 Nonetheless, legal aid is available: the Court of Human Rights has 
                                                                                                                                                                     
danger of another war. Nowhere were these feelings expressed more strongly than in Western Europe, 
where a federation of European states was considered by many to be the only sound basis upon which to 
build a lasting peace.” VICTORIA CURZON, THE ESSENTIALS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 28–29 (1974); but 
see Magdalena Ličková, European Exceptionalism in International Law, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 463, 489 
(2008) (suggesting that the European Member States only “embrace” their EU obligations without 
“infringing international ones” by negotiating exceptions from international standards). 
76 On Brussels and Luxembourg as the locations of the legislature and court, see, e.g., European 
Commission Directorate-General for Communication, Europe in 12 Lessons (2010), available at 
http://europa.eu/abc/12lessons/lesson_4/index_en.htm; Anna F. Triponel, Business and Human Rights Law: 
Diverging Trends in the United States and France, 23 AM. UNIV. INT’L L. REV. 855, 907 (2007). 
77 For example, The Human Rights Act 1998 incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights into 
U.K. law. See Jeremy Rabkin, Is EU Policy Eroding the Sovereignty of Non-Member States?, 1 CHI. J. 
INT'L L. 273, 278 (2000). 
78 All member states have accepted. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms art. 48, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 UNTS 246 (as amended by the Eleventh Protocol of May 
11, 1994). For example, in the judgment of February 25, 1982, Campbell & Cosans v. U.K., 48 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. A) (1982), the European Court reviewed the use of corporal punishment in British public school 
and found it to be in breach of the European Convention. The European Court required the payment of just 
compensation. 60 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1983).  
79 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 78, at 
art. 50. Indeed, the European Commission has stated that incentives for bringing frivolous cases such as 
punitive damages and contingency fees “increase the risk of abusive litigation to an extent which is not 
compatible with the European legal tradition.” SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION, COMMENTS ON THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION STAFF’S WORKING DOCUMENT: “TOWARDS A 
COHERENT EUROPEAN APPROACH TO COLLECTIVE REDRESS” 10, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer/dgs_consultations/ca/docs/aba_2sd_en.pdf (citation omitted).  
80 Stephens, supra note 33, at 31. 
81 See, e.g., EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES (Mireille Delmas-Marty & J.R. Spencer eds., 2002); Beth 
Van Schaack, In Defense of Civil Redress: The Domestic Enforcement of Human Rights Norms in the 
Context of the Proposed Hague Judgments Convention, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 141, 143–47 (2001); see also 
Brief of International Law Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellees at 19-23, Balintulo v. 
Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2009) (No. 09-2778-cv). 
82 See generally Jonathan Doak, Victims' Rights in Criminal Trials: Prospects for Participation, 32 J. L. & 
SOC. 294 (2005). 
83 But see Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 183 (D. Mass. 1995) (human rights violations are treated 
as “no more (or less) than a garden-variety municipal tort”).  
84 See Comm. Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties Under Article 19 of the 
Convention (The Netherlands), U.N. Doc. CAT/C/9/Add.1, at 31 (Mar. 20, 1990). 
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ruled that the right to a fair trial requires it.85 Tort cases brought against multinational 
companies in the United Kingdom, discussed below, received funding for expenses and 
legal fees from the U.K. Legal Services Commission.
 
Further, British lawyers that have 
brought winning claims receive compensation and can impose uplift fees on losing 
defendants.86 The lawyers may not arrange for contingency-fee payments, and none of 
the compensation awarded to plaintiffs contributes to the uplift fees.87 
 
 
V.  CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW IN THE EU MEMBER STATES 
¶26  In spite of these potential advantages, it has not been possible for foreign plaintiffs 
to redress extraterritorial corporate human rights abuses in a straightforward manner in 
the Member State courts of the EU.88 The national courts of many Member States have 
become adept at imposing criminal accountability on companies, but not for their 
extraterritorial acts; further, they have become adept at policing human rights abuses, but 
not against companies.89 Jurisdictional provisions hamper civil claims, and plaintiffs have 
had to stretch the provisions in order to gain forums in national courts of the EU.90  
 
A.   Corporate Accountability, But Not Extraterritorial 
¶27  Both the criminal and civil laws of most Member States of the EU have offered 
pathways to corporate liability, but neither has allowed for jurisdiction over harms that 
companies cause outside of the EU. The legal systems that have offered criminal rules 
that apply to companies have imposed the rules with geographic restrictions. Even where 
jurisdiction has been possible, public prosecutors have demonstrated their reluctance to 
pursue extraterritorial human rights claims, and some systems have scaled back their 
legislation. On the civil side, the Brussels Regulation governs jurisdiction among EU 
Member States and links it to the location where a wrong was carried out or where it 
                                                        
85 Airey v. Ireland, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21 (1979); see also Steel v. United Kingdom, 18 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 22 (2005) (legal and factual complexity of the case demanded counsel); Bertuzzi v. France, 2003-III 
Eur. Ct. H.R. 117 (2003) (representation necessary where deemed crucial); Aerts v. Belgium, 29 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 50 (1998) (denying legal aid infringes the right to a tribunal); Andronicou v. Cyprus, 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
389, ¶ 199 (1997) (access to the courts must be guaranteed). 
86 Courts and Legal Services Act, 1990, c. 41, §§ 58, 58A (U.K.); Richard Meeran, Tort Litigation Against 
Multinationals (“MNCs”) for Violation of Human Rights: An Overview of the Position Outside the US, 
BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE 14 (Mar. 7, 2011), http://business-humanrights.org/en/pdf-
tort-litigation-against-multinationals-%E2%80%9Cmncs%E2%80%9D-for-violation-of-human-rights-an-
overview-of-the-position-outside-the-us. 
87 U.K. CPR, PD 44, ¶ 9.1, available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part-
44-general-rules-about-costs/part-44-general-rules-about-costs2; but see MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, REFORMING 
CIVIL LITIGATION FUNDING IN ENGLAND & WALES – IMPLEMENTATION OF LORD JUSTICE JACKSON’S 
RECOMMENDATIONS: THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE, 2011, Parl. 8041 (U.K.), available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228974/8041.pdf; Meeran, 
supra note 86, at 14. Unlike the American contingency fee, the uplift fee is not an incentive to pursue a 
claim for its monetary value. It is simply the amount of the costs and a means of covering the costs of 
additional non-successful cases. 
88 See infra Section V. 
89 See infra Section V. 
90 See infra Section V. 
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occurred.91 Domestic tort cases that have tested the limits of the two definitions have 
exposed the absence of explicit provisions for extraterritorial jurisdiction.92 
 
Criminal Liability 
¶28  As a result of recent amendments, most Member States of the EU now provide for 
corporate criminal liability. Luxembourg, for example, instituted criminal liability for 
companies in 2010.93 Spain also amended its criminal code in 2010 to extend the offenses 
to companies.94 The Czech Republic introduced corporate criminal liability in 2012, 
overturning a presidential veto of legislation that had first been passed in 2011.95 Liability 
for extraterritorial activities, however, has grown increasingly limited. 
¶29  Corporate liability in the EU Member States typically depends on the crime having 
taken place within the territory of the national jurisdiction. The French Criminal Code has 
applied to companies since 1992 but in general does not allow for liability based on 
actions outside of France.96 Similarly, the Dutch Criminal Code applies only to corporate 
crimes carried out within the Netherlands.97 In the U.K., criminal jurisdiction is presumed 
territorial. While the U.K. has instituted legislation to hold companies accountable for the 
deaths they cause, the provisions do not reach extraterritorial offenses.98 Rather, claims 
must be based on acts or omissions that occurred within the U.K.99  
¶30  Exceptions to such territorial requirements hold little relevance for claims related to 
human rights abuses. The French Criminal Code allows for jurisdiction over companies 
alleged to have violated rules that themselves apply extraterritorially or that involve the 
counterfeiting of money or state seals.100 Under Article 5 of the Dutch Code, companies 
can be held liable for human trafficking and the sexual abuse of minors outside of the 
Netherlands.101 To protect Dutch national interests, Article 4 of the code also establishes 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over terrorist acts, crimes against state security, and 
corruption.102 In the U.K., while supplementary criminal statutes such as the International 
Criminal Court Act 2001 impose criminal liability on both domestic and non-domestic 
companies that act outside of British territory, the alleged perpetrator still must be present 
within the country at the time that the proceedings commence.103  
¶31  France has acted particularly proactively to eliminate obstacles to criminal 
accountability, but the measures have had limited application to extraterritorial corporate 
wrongdoing. No mens rea applies for companies, rendering it unnecessary to prove a 
                                                        
91 Council Regulation 44/2001, 2000 O.J. (L012) (EC) (on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement 
of judgments in civil and commercial matters). 
92 See infra notes 125–145. 
93 Code Penal art. 34 (Lux.).  
94 Organic Law (B.O.E. 2010, 5) (amending B.O.E. 1995, 10) (Spain). 
95 Act on Corporate Criminal Liability, zákon č. 418/2011 Sb. (Czech). 
96 CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN] art. 121–22 (Fr.). 
97 CODE PÉNAL [C.PÉN.] art. 51 (Belg.). 
98 See, e.g., Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act, 2007 c. 19 (U.K.) (creating new 
offenses for corporations). 
99 Id.  
100 CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN] arts. 113-6–113-12, 113-1C (Fr.). 
101 CODE PÉNAL [C.PÉN.] art. 5 (Belg.). 
102 Id. art. 4.  
103 International Criminal Court Act, 2001, c. 17, § 68 (U.K.).  
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proscribed mental state, but in order to be liable, companies must have caused harm 
within France.104 Companies may be held responsible for complicity in crimes taking 
place abroad, but liability depends on a finding of guilt in the foreign tribunal where the 
offense was committed.105 In the 2002 Rougier case, the requirement resulted in the 
dismissal of a complaint by Cameroonian farmers that the French timber company 
Rougier had been complicit in illicit trade undertaken by its Cameroonian subsidiary.106 
Because the subsidiary had not been found guilty in a Cameroonian court, the claim 
concerning the complicity of the French parent company could not proceed in French 
court.107   
¶32  The Total and Trafigura cases illustrate further obstacles posed by the discretion of 
French public prosecutors and narrow interpretations of the French criminal laws. In the 
Total case, Burmese citizens sought to hold the French oil company Total Fina Elf 
responsible for alleged actions the Burmese military had undertaken on its behalf. 
According to the complaint, the military used kidnapping and involuntary servitude in 
order to supply laborers to construct an oil pipeline.108 The Burmese plaintiffs charged 
the company with complicity in abduction and illegal restraint.109 The public prosecutor, 
however, requested dismissal of the case.110 His motion did not succeed, and the parties 
concluded an out-of-court settlement.111 Nevertheless, the court determined in an 
ordonnance de non-lieu, a judicial dismissal for lack of evidence, that the forced labor 
did not amount to an illegal restraint.112 In the Trafigura case, French citizens brought 
charges against the Dutch petroleum trading company Trafigura for illnesses arising from 
improper disposal of toxic waste in the Ivory Coast.113 The public prosecutor, however, 
did not pursue the case.114 
                                                        
104 JAMES FEATHERBY, GLOBAL BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: JURISDICTIONAL COMPARISONS 162 
(2011). 
105 CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN] art. 113-5 (Fr.). 
106 GLOBAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW FOR THE PRACTICING LAWYER 103, 131–32 (Andrew P. 
Morriss & Samuel Estreicher eds., 2010).  
107 Abigail Hansen, Case-Study: Crimes in Cameroon and the Role of North-South Cooperation in Seeking 
Justice from the French Courts, 11
TH
 INTERNATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION CONFERENCE (May 26, 2003), 
http://iacconference.org/en/archive/document/crimes_in_cameroon_and_the_role_of_north-
south_cooperation_in_seeking_justi/. 
108 Kirshner, supra note 1, at 285 n.171.  
109 Id. The plaintiffs claimed violation of article 224-1. See CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN] art. 224-1 (Fr.).  
110 Olivier De Schutter, Les Affaires Total et Unocal: Complicité et Extraterritorialité dans l'Imposition 
aux Entreprises d'Obligations en Matière de Droits de l'Homme [The Total and Unocal Cases: Complicity 
and Extraterritoriality in the Imposition of Human Rights Obligations on Corporations], 52 ANNUAIRE 
FRANÇAIS DE DROIT INT’L [French Yearbook of International Law] 55, 69–71 (2006). 
111 Id.; Press Release, Info Birmanie, International Federation for Human Rights and Ligue des Droits de 
l’Homme, Info Birmanie, the Ligue des Droits de l’Homme (LDH) and the International Federation for 
Human Rights (FIDH) Denounce the Agreement Reached Between Total and the Sherpa Association (Dec. 
1, 2005), available at http://www.reports-and-materials.org/FIDH-press-release-Total-settlement-1-Dec-
2005.pdf. 
112 OXFORD PRO BONO PUBLICO, OBSTACLES TO JUSTICE AND REDRESS FOR VICTIMS OF CORPORATE 
HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE 140 (Nov. 3, 2008), available at http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2014/05/OPBP-Comparative-submission-for-the-Special-Representative-on-Business-and-
Human-Rights-Nov-2008.pdf. 
113 Côte D’Ivoire. Une Vérité Toxique. Á Propos de Trafigura, Du Probo Koala et Du Déversement de 
Déchets Toxiques en Côte D’Ivoire. Résumé, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (Sept. 25, 2012), 
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¶33  Belgian law used to go farther beginning in 1994, but the Belgian legislature 
repealed provisions for extraterritorial corporate liability in 2003.115 Prior to 2003, 
Belgium offered jurisdiction over all humanitarian claims regardless of the crime’s 
connection to the country, the nationality of the plaintiffs or defendants, or the absence of 
defendants from the proceedings.116 A Belgian court therefore accepted review of a case 
against Total Fina Elf based on the same facts underlying the claims brought in the 
French court, as discussed above.117 In the aftermath of other controversial claims against 
high-ranking foreign officials,118 however, the U.S. threatened to move the NATO 
headquarters out of Brussels unless Belgium revoked the rules.119 Without the 
extraterritorial jurisdiction that they had offered, the Belgian court could no longer 
                                                                                                                                                                     
http://www.amnesty.org/fr/library/asset/AFR31/008/2012/fr/7754f65c-abdd-45e6-8bbb-
851c907763da/afr310082012en.html. 




115 Steven R. Ratner, Belgium’s War Crimes Statute: A Postmortem, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 888, 889 (2003); 
Sean D. Murphy, ed., Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 97 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 984, 986–87 (2003).  
116 Roemer Lemaître, Belgium Rules the World: Universal Jurisdiction over Human Rights Atrocities, 37 
JURA FALCONIS 255 (2000-2001), available at https://www.law.kuleuven.be/jura/art/37n2/lemaitre.htm. 
117 The case was brought under a complicated transitory provision (Article 29.3) of the Act on Grave 
Breaches of International Humanitarian Law of August 5, 2003. A number of intervening procedural 
judgments were made, after which the court finally dismissed the case on March 28, 2007. Cour de 
Cassation [Cass.] [Court of Cassation], Mar. 28, 2007, AR P.07.0031.F (Belg.). Efforts were undertaken to 
reopen the case, yet the Chambre des Mises en Accusation of the Brussels Court of Appeals, which 
announced its decision on March 5, 2008, refused to do so, on the grounds that the Court of Cassation 
judgment effectively closed the case (“autorité de la chose jugée”). See Joan Condijts, Les Birmans 
Déboutés: Total l'Emporte [Burmese Rejected: Total Wins], LE SOIR EN LIGNE, Mar. 5, 2008, available at 
http://archives.lesoir.be/les-birmans-deboutes-total-l-8217-emporte_t-20080305-00F4XH.html. A cassation 
appeal may possibly be filed, but the chance of success is minimal, given the previous decisions of the 
Court of Cassation in the case. 
118 See, e.g., New War Crimes Suits Filed Against Bush, Blair in Belgium, DAILY TIMES, June 20, 2003, 
available at http://archives.dailytimes.com.pk/national/20-Jun-2003/war-crimes-suits-filed-in-belgium-
against-bush-blair; Marlise Simons, Sharon Faces Belgian Trial After Term Ends, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 
2003, at A14.  
119 Lorna McGregor, The Need to Resolve the Paradoxes of the Civil Dimension of Universal Jurisdiction, 
99 AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW 125, 128 (2005); Belgium: Universal Jurisdiction Law Repealed, HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH (Aug. 2, 2003), http://www.hrw.org/news/2003/08/01/belgium-universal-jurisdiction-law-
repealed; David Wastell, America Threatens to Move NATO After Franks Is Charged, SUNDAY 
TELEGRAPH, May 18, 2003, available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/belgium/1430468/America-threatens-to-move-Nato-
after-Franks-is-charged.html; Vernon Loeb, Rumsfeld Says Belgian Law Could Imperil Funds for 
NATO, WASH. POST, June 13, 2003, at A24; Richard Boucher, U.S. Dep't of State Spokesman, U.S. Dep't 
of State Daily Press Briefing, at 10–11 (June 13, 2003), available at http://2001-
2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2003/21566.htm (the “Secretary of State has raised these concerns in public 
and in private with the Belgians. The Secretary of Defense has raised them in public and in private with the 
Belgians. The goal is to get them to change the law, and so none of these other questions will arise.”); 
Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, Transcript (June 12, 2003), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2742. 
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adjudicate the case against Total.120 It could not pursue allegations brought by Burmese 
citizens against a French company for abuses in Burma.121 
¶34  Similarly, while Spanish courts previously offered a forum for extraterritorial 
claims, the Spanish Parliament acted to limit the jurisdiction over human rights cases in 
2009.122 Under the earlier provisions in Spain, in force since 1985, allegations of the most 
serious crimes in violation of international law triggered jurisdiction, no matter where the 
actions had taken place.123 Controversial cases against individuals followed, including 
against Augusto Pinochet, raising diplomatic concerns.124 The new rules now require 
claims to allege either Spanish victims or perpetrators that are present in Spain before 
jurisdiction can arise.125  
 
Civil Liability 
¶35  Just as the corporate criminal laws of the EU Member States generally lack 
extraterritorial reach, the creative use of domestic civil tort claims has underscored the 
absence of civil mechanisms for holding companies accountable explicitly for 
extraterritorial abuses.126 The Brussels Regulation provides for extraterritorial jurisdiction 
only within the EU.127 The isolated cases in which companies have been found 
responsible for harms beyond Europe have tested the limits of the Brussels Regulation by 
framing domestic actions and omissions of national parent companies as the proximate 
cause of the abuses directly carried out by their foreign subsidiaries.128 
¶36  The Brussels Regulation establishes intra-EU extraterritorial jurisdiction, but the 
jurisdiction does not extend to claims against non-EU entities.129 Under the Regulation, 
“[p]ersons domiciled in a[n EU] Member State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued 
                                                        
120 Loi relative a la repression des violations graves de droit international humanitaire [Law Relating to the 
Repression of the Serious Violations of Humanitarian International Law] of Feb. 10, 1999, MONITEUR 
BELGE [M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], Feb. 10, 1999 (Belg.), available at 
http://www.preventgenocide.org/fr/droit/codes/belgique.htm. 
121 Universal Jurisdiction in Europe – The State of the Art, 18 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 1, 37–38 (2006), 
available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ij0606web.pdf. 
122 Organic Law (L.O.P.J. 1985, art. 23.4) (Spain); see also I. de la Rasilla del Moral, The Swan Song of 
Universal Jurisdiction in Spain, 9 INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 777 (2009). 
123 See generally Olga Martin-Ortega & Jordi Palou-Loverdos, Preserving Spain’s Universal Jurisdiction 
Law in the Common Interest, JURIST, June 26, 2009, available at http://jurist.org/forum/2009/06/protecting-
spains-universal.php. 
124 See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Pinochet Precedent and Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 
311 (2001). 
125 PRINCETON UNIV., THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, 16 (2001), available at 
https://lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/unive_jur.pdf (Universal jurisdiction generally includes “genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes and torture.”); Maximo Langer, The Diplomacy of Universal 
Jurisdiction: The Political Branches and the Transnational Prosecution of International Crimes, 105 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 1, 37-40 (2011). 
126 See infra notes 126–145. 
127 Council Regulation 44/2001, supra note 91. 
128 Id. 
129 Id.; see also DANIEL AUGENSTEIN & ALAN BOYLE, STUDY OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT APPLICABLE TO EUROPEAN ENTERPRISES OPERATING OUTSIDE THE 
EUROPEAN UNION (Oct. 30, 2010). 
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in the courts of that [EU] Member State.”130 A company or other legal person “is 
domiciled at the place where it has its: (a) statutory seat, or (b) central administration, or 
(c) principal place of business.”131  
¶37  Jurisdiction over extraterritorial harms caused by foreign subsidiaries of companies 
domiciled in the EU has not followed easily. Pursuant to the Regulation, the national laws 
of the European Member State courts in which cases against foreign subsidiaries have 
been brought determine residual jurisdiction over the non-EU entities.132 
¶38  The laws of most Member States of the EU permit jurisdiction only when proof 
exists that the companies have abused their corporate status, in order to “pierce the 
corporate veil” and to connect the wrongful acts of the foreign subsidiaries to their 
Member State-domiciled parent companies.133 The rules of most Member States of the 
EU otherwise do not allow for direct jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries, or for 
jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries of foreign parent companies.134  
¶39  Perhaps for this reason, British and Dutch courts have characterized harm caused 
by foreign subsidiaries as resulting from actions or omissions of domestic parent 
companies as a means for assuming jurisdiction over extraterritorial human rights 
abuses.135 The claims have ostensibly addressed the role of the parent companies in 
allowing their foreign subsidiaries to cause harm, but the judgments have ramifications 
for the conduct of the subsidiaries.136 In these cases, plaintiffs can reach the parent 
                                                        
130 Council Regulation 44/2001, supra note 91, art. 2(1) (on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters). 
131 Id. art. 60(1). 
132 For a discussion on residual rules, see Study on Residual Jurisdiction General Report No. 
JLS/C4/2005/07-30-CE)0040309/00-37 of 23 Sept. 2007, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_residual_jurisdiction_en.pdf (prepared by Prof. Arnaud 
Nuyts et al. as part of a service contract with the EC); see also Report on the Application of Regulation 
Brussels I in the Member States Study JLS/C4/2005/03 of Sept. 2007, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_application_brussels_1_en.pdf (prepared by Prof. 
Burkhard Hess et al.). 
133 Augenstein & Boyle, supra note 129, at 62–63, 69. Piercing the corporate veil generally requires mixing 
of assets (Germany, Italy, Romania, Slovenia, France), or the abuse of the separate legal personality of the 
subsidiary or parent to defeat the rights of stakeholders or to commit other illegalities (France, Slovenia, 
Italy).  
134 The European Commission has raised the possibility of extending the Regulation to claims against 
foreign subsidiaries of European parent corporations in a Green paper, but this has not happened. See 
European Commission Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001, COM (2009) 
175 final (Apr. 21, 2009); Council Regulation 44/2001, supra note 91 at art. 4(1); see also Hess, supra note 
132. 
135 See, e.g., Ramasastry, supra note 33, at 92–93; JOHN RUGGIE, OXFORD PRO BONO PUBLICO, OBSTACLES 
TO JUSTICE AND REDRESS FOR VICTIMS OF CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE 284 (2008), available at 
http://www2.law.ox.ac.uk/opbp/Oxford-Pro-Bono-Publico-submission-to-Ruggie-3-Nov-2008.pdf; infra 
notes 147–148. 
136 See Case C-412/98, Group Josi Reinsurance Co. v. Universal Gen. Ins. Co., 2000 E.C.R. I-5925, ¶¶ 57, 
59 (“It follows that, as a general rule, the place where the plaintiff is domiciled is not relevant for the 
purpose of applying the rules of jurisdiction laid down by the [Brussels] [C]onvention, since that 
application is, in principle, dependent solely on the criterion of the defendant's domicile being in a 
Contracting State . . . . Consequently, the Convention does not, in principle, preclude the rules of 
jurisdiction which it sets out from applying to a dispute between a defendant domiciled in a Contracting 
State and a plaintiff domiciled in a non-member country.”); see generally Commission of the European 
Communities: Green Paper “Promoting a European Framework for Corporate Social Responsibility,” 
COM (2001) 366 final (July 18, 2001); see also Jessica Woodroffe, Regulating Multinational Corporations 
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company without establishing abuse of the corporate form to “pierce the corporate veil” 
and without connecting the actions of the subsidiary to the parent. Similarly, courts can 
avoid exercising exterritorial jurisdiction, as they are simply adjudicating whether 
companies within their jurisdiction should be held accountable for failing to oversee their 
foreign subsidiaries.137 
¶40  The U.K. courts have heard several such lawsuits against domestic parent 
companies in the tort context related to human rights abuses.138 In Sithole v. Thor, the 
English Court of Appeals found jurisdiction over mercury poisoning among employees at 
a mining subsidiary in South Africa by reviewing the failure of the British parent 
company to prevent it.139 Similarly, Connelly v. RTZ and Lubbe v. Cape Plc confirmed 
that British courts will exercise jurisdiction over domestic parent companies when 
foreign subsidiaries, which cause harm abroad, have implemented their policies.140 The 
English High Court also found jurisdiction in Guerrero v. Monterrico Metals over the 
alleged assault, torture, and detention of protestors at a subsidiary mining site in Peru by 
Peruvian police.141 The court focused on the parent company’s responsibility to prevent 
the harm.142 In Motto & Ors v. Trafigura, the English High Court took jurisdiction over 
the claims of 30,000 people of the Ivory Coast for illness arising from exposure to toxic 
waste, because a British arm of the metals and energy company chartered the ship that 
carried the waste to Africa.143 Unlike the French Trafigura case, as discussed above, the 
claims in the English courts resulted in a successful settlement.144 
¶41  The Netherlands has also embraced jurisdiction in similar contexts. In Oguru c.s. v. 
Royal Dutch Shell, the Dutch Hague District Court found jurisdiction over linked claims 
against the Dutch parent company Royal Dutch Shell and its subsidiary Shell Nigeria.145 
In that case, Nigerian fisherman and farmers alleged that the parent company had been 
                                                                                                                                                                     
in A World of Nation States, in HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS 131, 138 (Michael K. Addo ed., 1999). 
137 Jan Wouters & Cedric Ryngaert, Litigation for Overseas Corporate Human Rights Abuses in the 
European Union: The Challenge of Jurisdiction, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 939, 947 (2009) (“By 
focusing on the parent's duty of care, the court hearing a transnational liability case circumvents the thorny 
issue of “‘piercing the corporate veil;’” the parent is held liable for its own violations rather than for the 
violations of its subsidiaries as different legal entities.”). 
138 See, e.g., Stephens, supra note 33, at 39 (discussing domestic tort suits in country where firm is 
incorporated); Richard Meeran, Accountability of Transnationals for Human Rights Abuses, 148 NEW L.J. 
1706, 1706–07 (1998). 
139 Sithole v. Thor Chemicals Holdings Ltd., [1999] 09 LS Gaz R 32, CA, The Digest 236 (Eng.).  
140 Connelly v. RTZ, [1997] UKHL 30 (U.K.); Lubbe v. Cape Plc, [2000] UKHL 41, [2000] 4 All Eng. 
Rep. 268, 271–72 (U.K.); see generally Peter Muchlinski, Corporations in International Litigation: 
Problems of Jurisdiction and the United Kingdom Asbestos Case, 50 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1 (2001). 
141 Guerrero v. Monterrico Metals, [2009] EWHC (QB) 2475 (Eng.). 
142 Id. 
143 Motto v. Trafigura Ltd. [2001] EWCA Civ 1150; see also Deadly Toxic Waste Dumping in Côte 
d’Ivoire Clearly a Crime – UN Environmental Agency, UN NEWS CENTRE, (Sept. 29, 2006), 
www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=20083&Cr=ivoire&Cr1; Michael Peel, European Lawyers in a 
Hunt for Big Game, FINANCIAL TIMES, (Jan. 31, 2008). 
144 Timeline of Events, TRAFIGURA, http://www.trafigura.com/media-centre/probo-
koala/timeline/2009/september/12676/; David Jolly, Ivory Coast Toxic-Dump Case Settled, Company Says, 
N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 21, 2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/21/business/global/21iht-
toxic.html?_r=1&scp=13&sq=trafigura&st=nyt. (affirming that up to 30,000 injured Ivory Coast residents 
could be compensated). 
145 HA ZA 30 december 2009, 579 m.nt. (Oguru/Royal Dutch Shell) (Neth.) 
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negligent in its oversight, which enabled its foreign subsidiary in Nigeria to produce oil 
in a dangerous manner.146 Because the plaintiffs had targeted Royal Dutch Shell as well 
as Shell Nigeria for the same damage, the Dutch court found that it would be more 
efficient to adjudicate both actions together in the Netherlands, and thus exerted 
jurisdiction over the foreign entity.147 
 
B.   Human Rights Accountability But Not Corporate 
¶42  In contrast to the measures that allow for jurisdiction over companies but not for 
extraterritorial acts, many EU Member States offer human rights legislation that applies 
extraterritorially; however, most of the laws exclude companies. Germany offers 
extraterritorial liability for human rights abuses, but the statutes do not apply to corporate 
crimes. Similarly, Sweden imposes accountability for any violation of an international 
treaty, but its humanitarian measures are limited to natural persons. While the U.K. has 
made many human rights provisions expressly extraterritorial, the punishments that the 
provisions impose preclude corporate liability. In theory, Dutch courts may hold 
companies liable for human rights abuses, but even where the strict jurisdictional criteria 
have been met, no companies have been prosecuted.148  
¶43  Germany has introduced sweeping extraterritorial human rights legislation; 
however, the legislation does not apply to companies. In Germany, companies can only 
face administrative sanctions, not criminal liability, and individual plaintiffs have no 
private cause of action through which to seek the imposition of the administrative 
sanctions against them.149  
¶44  The German Code of Crimes Against International Law, enacted in 2002 in 
response to the creation of the International Criminal Court, incorporates crimes under 
the jurisdiction of the court into German law and extends primary jurisdiction to German 
tribunals.150 The code criminalizes all violations of international law perpetrated by 
individuals, even if the criminal acts occurred outside of Germany.151 The law applies to 
crimes committed abroad against German citizens if the actions are punishable by the law 
of the place where the crimes occurred or if no criminal law enforcement existed at the 
                                                        
146 Id; see The People of Nigeria Versus Shell: The Course of the Lawsuit, MILIEU DEFENSIE, 
http://milieudefensie.nl/publicaties/factsheets/the-course-of-the-lawsuit/view. 
147 HA ZA 30 december 2009, 2009, 579 m.nt. (Oguru/Royal Dutch Shell) (Neth.); see MILIEU DEFENSIE, 
supra note 146; see Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering [RV] [Code of Civil Procedure], art. 7(1) 
(Neth.); see also A.G. Castermans & J.A. van der Weide, The Legal Liability of Dutch Parent Companies 
for Subsidiaries’ Involvement in Violations of Fundamental, Internationally Recognised Rights 8 (Dec. 15, 
2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1626225. 
148 Nicola M.C.P. Jagers & Marie-Jose van der Heijden, Corporate Human Rights Violations: The 
Feasibility of Civil Recourse in the Netherlands, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 833, 865 (2008). 
149 Sara S. Beale & Adam G. Safwat, What Developments in Western Europe Tell Us About American 
Critiques of Corporate Criminal Liability, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 89, 122-26 (2004); Thomas Weigend, 
Societas Delinquere non Potest? A German Perspective, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 927, 936 (2008). 
150 VöLKERSTRAFGESETZBUCH [VSTGB] [CODE OF CRIMES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL LAW GERMANY 
(CCAIL)], June 26, 2002, STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] § 1 (Ger.). 
151 Section 1 of the CCAIL provides: “This Act shall apply to all criminal offences against international 
law designated under this Act, to serious criminal offences designated therein even when the offence was 
committed abroad and bears no relation to Germany.” Id. 
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place where the crime was committed.152 The law also applies to crimes committed 
abroad by German citizens, also so long as the actions are illegal in the place where they 
occurred or if no criminal law enforcement existed there.153 Foreigners can be sued in 
German court if they have been apprehended within German territory and would qualify 
for extradition, even if they have not been extradited.154 German prosecutors, however, 
can withdraw jurisdiction in any case in which neither the victim nor the defendant is 
German, or if the defendant is not present in Germany.155 
¶45  In spite of the limitations, the legislation has formed the basis of several recent 
prosecutions of individuals for extraterritorial crimes. A trial is currently underway in 
Stuttgart against the former president and vice president of the Democratic Forces for the 
Liberation of Rwanda, a Rwandan rebel group, for their involvement in crimes against 
humanity and war crimes, allegedly carried out by militias under their direction in the 
Eastern Congo.156 Twelve Iraqi citizens have filed a complaint in Germany under the 
statute for their detention at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq against former Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld, former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, former CIA 
Director George Tenet, and 11 other former Bush administration officials and military 
officers.157 A Saudi citizen has also contested his detention at Guantanamo Bay using the 
provisions.158 
¶46  In Sweden, the legal system imposes comprehensive illegality for extraterritorial 
crimes that violate international law, but it does not provide for corporate liability. 
Chapter 2, Section 3(6) of the Swedish Penal Code states that “crimes committed outside 
the Realm shall be adjudged according to Swedish Law and by a Swedish court: . . . if the 
crime is . . . a crime against international law.”159 Like Germany, however, general 




155 Steffen Wirth, Germany's New International Crimes Code: Bringing a Case to Court, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. 
JUST. 151, 159 (2003). 
156 See Festnahme Mutmaβlicher Führungsfunktionäre der “Forces Démocaratiques de Libérations du 
Rwanda” (FDLR), DER GENERALBUNDESANWALT [GBA] [ATTORNEY GENERAL OF GERMANY] Nov. 17, 
2009, http://www.generalbundesanwalt.de/de/showpress.php?themenid=11&newsid=347. 
157 Criminal Indictment Against Donald Rumsfeld et al., CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (Nov. 14, 
2006), https://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/current-cases/german-war-crimes-complaint-against-donald-rumsfeld-
et-al; see, e.g., Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Torture in Abu Ghraib: The Complaint Against Donald Rumsfeld 
Under the German Code of Crimes Against International Law, 6 GER. L.J. 689, 691–93 (2005); Denis 
Basak, Abu Ghreib, das Pentagon und die Deutsche Justiz, 18 J. INT’L L. OF PEACE AND ARMED CONFLICT 
85 (2005); Wolfgang Kaleck, Strafanzeige gegen Donald Rumsfeld, REPUBLIKANISCHER ANWäLTINNEN- 
UND ANWäLTEVEREIN 2005, http://www.rav.de/publikationen/infobriefe/archiv/infobrief-94-
2005/strafanzeige-gegen-donald-rumsfeld/; Keine Deutschen Ermittlungen wegen der Angezeigten Vorfälle 
von Abu Ghraib/Irak, DER GENERALBUNDESANWALT [GBA] [ATTORNEY GENERAL OF GERMANY] Feb. 10, 
2005, https://www.generalbundesanwalt.de/de/showpress.php?newsid=163. 
158 Katherine Gallagher, Universal Jurisdiction in Practice: Efforts to Hold Donald Rumsfeld and Other 
High-Level United States Officials Accountable for Torture, 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1087, 1106 (2009); 
Scott Lyons, German Criminal Complaint Against Donald Rumsfeld and Others, 10 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 
INSIGHTS 1, 2 (2006). 
159 BROTTSBALKEN [BRB] [CRIMINAL CODE] 16:8 (Swed.). 
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Swedish law provides only for administrative sanctions against companies, not criminal 
liability.160 
¶47  In the U.K., the punishments linked to relevant criminal provisions, even though 
they allow jurisdiction over extraterritorial wrongs, limit their application to companies. 
Abuses such as torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, genocide, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity carry express extraterritorial jurisdiction.161 The offense of 
inhuman and degrading treatment, however, is limited to public officials.162 Genocide, 
war crimes, and crimes against humanity are punishable solely by imprisonment.163 
Because companies cannot be imprisoned, corporate criminal liability cannot arise.164 
While breach of the Geneva Conventions is a statutory offense,165 corporate liability for 
such actions is also not possible because the punishment is imprisonment.166 
¶48  In the Netherlands, the International Crimes Act (2003) incorporates the crimes 
recognized under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court into domestic 
law,167 but no companies have ever been prosecuted there for extraterritorial violations of 
human rights law.168 In theory, liability may be imposed on companies for genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and torture, where the perpetrator or victim of the 
crime is Dutch or if the alleged perpetrator is present in the Netherlands.169 Even where a 
company could meet the jurisdictional thresholds, however, the Van Anraat case shows 
the obstacles to gathering the evidence necessary for establishing corporate liability.170 
¶49  In the Van Anraat case, an individual person, rather than the company he directed, 
was prosecuted for the crimes of genocide and complicity in war crimes.171 Frans Van 
Anraat, a Dutch businessman in charge of the FCA Contractor company had provided a 
gas called TDG to the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq that the regime used to make 
                                                        
160 The Swedish Penal Code allows the public prosecutor to seek the imposition of corporate fines. 
Brottsbalken [BrB] [Criminal Code] Ch. 36 (Swed.); see, e.g., ALLENS ARTHUR ROBINSON, ‘CORPORATE 
CULTURE’ AS A BASIS FOR THE CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS (2008), http://www.reports-and-
materials.org/Allens-Arthur-Robinson-Corporate-Culture-paper-for-Ruggie-Feb-2008.pdf. 
161 Criminal Justice Act, 1988, c. 33, § 134 (U.K.); International Criminal Courts Act, 2001, c. 7, §§ 51–52 
(U.K.). 
162 Criminal Justice Act, 1988, c. 33, § 134 (U.K.); see also European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 79, art. 3. 
163 International Criminal Courts Act, 2001, c. 17, § 53 (U.K.). 
164 Corporations, (1973) 11 HALS. STAT. (4th ed.) ¶ 1280.  
165 Geneva Conventions Act, 6 Eliz. 2, c. 52, §1 (1957) (U.K); see also International Criminal Courts Act, 
2001, c. 17, § 70 (U.K.). 
166 Geneva Conventions Act, 6 Eliz. 2, c. 52, §1A (1957) (U.K). 
167 Wet Internationale Misdrijven [International Crimes Act], June 19, 2003, Stb. 2003, p. 270 (Neth.). 
168 Jagers & van der Heijden, supra note 148, at 865. 
169 Wet Internationale Misdrijven [International Crimes Act], June 19, 2003, § 2(2), Stb. 2003, p. 270  
(Neth.). 
170 Guus Kouwenhoven, another businessman, has also been sued individually in the Netherlands. He was 
convicted of breaching U.N. weapons smuggling prohibitions but was acquitted on appeal. See Hof’s-
Gravenhage [Court of Appeals], 10 maart 2008, LJN BC6068 (Neth.); Rechtsbank’s-Gravenhage [District 
Court of The Hague] 7 juni 2006, LJN AX7098 (Neth.). 
171 Hof’s-Gravenhage [Court of Appeals], 10 maart 2008, LJN BC6068 (Neth.); Rechtsbank’s-Gravenhage 
[District Court of The Hague] 7 juni 2006, LJN AX7098 (Neth.); see Wetboek van Strafrecht [SR] [Dutch 
Criminal Code], art. 48 (Neth.); Uitvoeringswet Genocideverdrag [Law for the Implementation of the 
Genocide Convention], July 2, 1964, Stb. 1964, p. 243 (Neth.); Wet Oorlogsstrafrecht [Wartime Offenses 
Act], July 10, 1952, Stb. 1952, p. 408 (Neth.). 
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mustard gas.172 The mustard gas was deployed as a chemical weapon against the Kurdish 
minority and in the Iran–Iraq war.173 The district court in the Hague found Van Anraat 
guilty of complicity in war crimes, although it exonerated him on the charge of genocide 
based on the finding that he had not been aware of the genocidal intentions of his 
customers.174 The decision to prosecute Van Anraat individually, rather than through his 
company, has been viewed as the result of evidentiary difficulties stemming from 
complex corporate legal structures.175 
 
 
VI.  HOW TO FACILITATE JURISDICTION AMONG THE EU MEMBER STATES 
¶50  The retraction of extraterritorial jurisdiction over corporate human rights claims in 
the U.S. has offered the courts of the EU Member States a new opportunity to change 
course. Article 6 of the Convention on Human Rights could provide a pathway for the 
courts to begin to impose extraterritorial corporate accountability. Their leadership in this 
area would contribute to a European identity grounded in the advancement of 
fundamental rights. Moral leadership seems likely to attract greater popular support for 
an integrated Europe than economic achievements have engendered.176  
¶51  Article 6 guarantees the right to a fair and public hearing, within a reasonable time, 
by an independent and impartial tribunal, and the right to a fair trial includes the right of 
access to court.177 Specifically, Subsection 1 of Article 6 states, “In the determination of 
his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled 
to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law . . . .”178 
¶52  Although the Convention of Human Rights was drafted by the Council of Europe 
and has more signatories than the EU Member States, it nevertheless expresses the 
aspirations of a unified Europe. After direct experience of abuses during World War II, 
many European citizens gathered at the Hague Congress in 1948 to call for the 
development of a regional system of human rights and the creation of a European 
                                                        
172 JERNEJ LETNAR ČERNIČ, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND BUSINESS: CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS 149 (2010); see Trial Watch: Frans van Anraat, TRIAL.ORG (Apr. 7, 2014), 
http://www.trial-ch.org/en/ressources/trial-watch/trial-
watch/profils/profile/286/action/show/controller/Profile/tab/legal-procedure.html. 
173 JERNEJ LETNAR ČERNIČ, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND BUSINESS: CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS 149 (2010); see Trial Watch: Frans van Anraat, TRIAL.ORG (Apr. 7, 2014), 
http://www.trial-ch.org/en/ressources/trial-watch/trial-
watch/profils/profile/286/action/show/controller/Profile/tab/legal-procedure.html. 
174 Rechtbank‘s-Gravenhage 23 december 2005, LJN 2005, AV6353, 09/751003-04 (Van Anraat). The 
decision was affirmed on appeal, with some changes to the sentence. See Rechtbank ‘s-Gravenhage 9 mei 
2007, LJN 2007,  BA4676, 22-000509-06 (Van Anraant); HR 30 juni 2009, 07/10742 (Van Anraat). 
175 See, e.g., INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES INVOLVING 
CORPORATIONS: THE NETHERLANDS 9 (2010), available at http://icj.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/06/Netherlands-access-justice-publication-2010.pdf; Jagers & van der Heijden, supra 
note 148, at 863. 
176 See supra notes 45–50. 
177 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 79, 
art. 6. 
178 Id. at art. 6(1). 
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Assembly, in order to avoid a repetition of the serious human rights violations that had 
taken place, and to protect against communism.179 Winston Churchill presided over a 
discussion of how to develop European political cooperation.180 In 1949, the European 
countries founded the Council of Europe, and the European Coal and Steel Community 
was envisaged in 1950.181 The Convention on Human Rights was drafted in Strasbourg in 
1949, under the auspices of the Council of Europe.182 Today, the Council of Europe 
includes every Member Sate of the EU.183 All of them, as well as the EU itself, are party 
to the Convention.184  
¶53  The Court of Human Rights enforces the Convention.185 Although the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (“ECJ”) is a separate institution, under the Treaty of 
Lisbon, it is bound by the decisional law of the Court of Human Rights.186 Because the 
EU and all of the EU Member States are signatories to the Convention on Human Rights, 
the ECJ also refers cases to the Court of Human Rights and views the Convention as 
                                                        
179 See, e.g., LEONARD JASON-LLOYD & SUKHWINDER BAJWA, THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 1 (1997) (suggesting European integration would prevent repetition of the atrocities leading up to 
World War II); see also, Clarence C. Walton, The Hague “Congress of Europe:” A Case Study of Public 
Opinion, 12 W. POL. Q. 738 (1959); see also JULIE SMITH, EUROPE’S ELECTED PARLIAMENT 27–38 (1999). 
180 See, generally, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, MANUAL OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE 3–4 (1970). 
181 The countries that founded the Council of Europe included Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the U.K. See Statute of the Council of Europe, May 5, 
1949, 87 U.N.T.S. 103, E.T.S. 1; Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 
1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140, as amended, Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 2; see also A Peaceful Europe – The Beginnings of Cooperation, EUROPEAN UNION, 
http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/1945-1959/index_en.htm. 
182 See, e.g., Gary Born, A New Generation of International Adjudication, 61 DUKE L.J. 775, 818 n.165 
(2012) (“The ECHR is not an EU institution; it was created by the European Convention on Human Rights 
under the auspices of the Council of Europe, and it includes a number of non-EU members, such as Turkey 
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THE CREATION OF A PERMANENT COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 17–38, 49 (2010); European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 79. 
183 Constant Brand, EU Faces 'Tricky' Talks With Council Of Europe, EUROPEAN VOICE (Feb. 16, 2010), 
available at http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/eu-faces-tricky-talks-with-council-of-europe/. 
184 See, e.g., Accession of the European Union, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, http://hub.coe.int/what-we-do/human-
rights/eu-accession-to-the-convention. 
185 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 79, 
art. 33 (“Any High Contracting Party may refer to the Court any alleged breach of the provisions of the 
Convention and the protocols thereto by another High Contracting Party.”); id. art. 34 (“The Court may 
receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to 
be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention 
or the protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective 
exercise of this right.”); Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Restructuring the Control Machinery Established Thereby art. 19, Nov. 1, 1998, 
E.T.S. 155 (opened for signature May 11, 1994). 
186 Fifty Years Of European Union Law: A Panel Of Present And Former Judges, 31 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 
1741, 1749 (2008); see also Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, 
Declaration on Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union, U.N. Doc. OJ C 83/337 (March 2010) 
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integral to EU law.187 Both the EU and its Member States are subject to the Convention 
and to external monitoring of their human rights activities.188 EU institutions are also 
required to conform to the Convention by Article 6 of the Treaty of Nice.189 
¶54  The Court of Human Rights has already interpreted Article 6 of the Convention 
broadly, and some EU Member States have suggested that Article 6 supports 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. In Delcourt v. Belgium, the Court stated that “[i]n a 
democratic society within the meaning of the Convention, the right to a fair 
administration of justice holds such a prominent place that a restrictive interpretation of 
Article 6 para. 1 (art 6-1) would not correspond to the aim and the purpose of that 
provision.”190 It has frequently stated that rights under the Convention must be “practical 
and effective” and not “theoretical or illusory.”191 
¶55  In later cases, the Court has held that the Convention on Human Rights 
encompasses a right of access to court, even though the text of the document does not 
expressly include one. In Golder v. U.K., it found that Article 6 “secures to everyone the 
right to have any claim relating to his civil rights and obligations brought before a court 
or tribunal.”192 It would therefore, the Court went on to state, be impossible for Article 6 
to “describe in detail the procedural guarantees afforded to parties in a pending lawsuit 
and . . . not first protect that which alone makes it in fact possible to benefit from such 
guarantees, that is, access to a court.”193  
¶56  In Lubbe v. Cape, a foreign direct liability case concerning the claims of more than 
3,000 South Africans that the actions of a subsidiary of the Cape mining company 
exposed them to asbestos, the U.K. indicated that Article 6 might oblige signatories to the 
Convention on Human Rights to ensure access to their courts by foreign claimants.194 The 
case turned on whether Article 6 enabled jurisdiction in a British court. The plaintiffs 
contended that a ruling that the case could only be brought in a South African court 
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v. 15 Member States of the European Union, App. No. 73274/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-90864 (in French); La Société Etablissement 
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amounted to a violation of their right to a fair trial.195 “Because of the lack of funding and 
legal representation in South Africa,” they stated in court submissions, denying the 
British forum would be to “den[y] [them of] . . . a fair trial on terms of litigious equality 
with the defendant.”196 Ultimately, the British House of Lords found jurisdiction on other 
grounds.197 
¶57  Since Lubbe v. Cape, the Court of Human Rights has itself suggested that Article 6 
might apply in foreign direct liability cases. In Markovic v. Italy, a case reviewing the 
refusal of Italian courts to assume jurisdiction over the claims of victims of NATO 
bombings in Yugoslavia that Italy owed them damages, the Court stated that if the law of 
the place where the harm occurred offers a right to bring a claim, then Article 6 applies, 
and a case may be brought in the court of one of the Member States.198 In most cases, a 
claim against a foreign corporation would appear to meet the threshold requirements set 
out in Markovic. The claimants could simply show that the legal system where the harm 
took place hampers their access to justice, for example through complicated procedural 
requirements, high costs, or the unavailability of representation.199 
¶58  If the Court of Human Rights were to hand down an explicit ruling, or if the courts 
of the EU Member States proceeded independently on the interpretation, then the courts 
of the EU Member States would have a basis for hearing extraterritorial human rights 
claims against most foreign subsidiaries. Access to justice in foreign direct liability cases, 
as discussed above, often can be obtained only by providing foreign victims with 
alternative forums. 
¶59  Cases decided in national courts in the EU demonstrate that several EU Member 
States support drawing on Article 6 to assume extraterritorial jurisdiction. Many Member 
States subscribe to the doctrine of forum necessitatis, a ground for reviewing claims that 
cannot be initiated anywhere else, in order to prevent the denial of justice.200 Belgium and 
the Netherlands have provided for jurisdiction over non-European defendants on the basis 
of the doctrine, stating explicitly that they have done so to comply with the requirements 
of Article 6.201 French courts, too, have cited Article 6 as the rationale for exceptional 
jurisdiction, where no other court could offer a forum, in a dispute between an Iranian 
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company and the state of Israel, as well as in an employment claim against an 
international organization.202 
¶60  Although the Court of Human Rights has allowed sovereign immunity to restrict 
the remit of Article 6, the U.K. has nevertheless cabined the holdings and provided a 
forum for claims against individual officials. In Al-Adsani v. Kuwait, the Court of Human 
Rights found that sovereign immunity can limit the right of access to court.203 Al-Adsani, 
a Kuwaiti citizen, fled to the U.K. and brought an action there alleging torture against the 
Kuwaiti government.204 The British courts originally dismissed the claim on the grounds 
of sovereign immunity, and Al-Adsani appealed to the Court of Human Rights.205 In a 
close vote, the justices decided that dismissal of the case had not violated Article 6 of the 
Convention on Human Rights.206 In Jones v. Saudi Arabia, however, the English Court of 
Appeal subsequently allowed jurisdiction over allegations of torture against individual 
officials in Saudi Arabia, as distinct from claims against the Saudi Arabian state itself.207 
The English court applied the Al-Adsani judgment so as to minimize the possible 
narrowing of Article 6.208 
 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
¶61  Extraterritorial human rights claims against companies could find a home in the 
courts of the EU Member States. The groundwork has been laid for Article 6 to 
counterbalance the retraction of extraterritorial jurisdiction taking place in the U.S. 
Although multinational corporations expose the limits of territorially-based legal systems, 
the EU could offer a mechanism for extraterritorial accountability on the basis of Article 
6. In the current economic climate, leadership in human rights could provide a renewed 
purpose for European integration. It is time for the EU to offer avenues for the legal 
redress of corporate human rights abuses. 
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